Rare books Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson House, 1949.
First edition. Ryle's main work that set out to correct the mistake of talking about mind and matter as “terms of the same logical type”, thus aiming at an alleged mistake of Descartes’ dualism, which had so deeply effected Western philosophy since the 17th century. When Ryle claims that he wants to correct the “logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess” (i.e. about mental powers and operations), he aims at Descarte's separation of mind and matter. He claims that this “myth” constitutes a categorical mistake that places facts belonging to the physical within a framework of categories that are essentially different to those of the mental, although they bear the same categorical names. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body, and we need no "ghost in the machine" to explain human qualities.
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson House, 1949.